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SUMMARY

CHEH-CHENG WANG EX REL. THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. FMC
CORP.: FALSE CLAIMS ACT BAR MAY BE
OVERTURNED BY PENDING LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION

In Wang ex ret. The United States v. FMC Corp./ the
Ninth Circuit held that a private individual (a qui tam plaintiff)
cannot base a suit on behalf of the government under the False
Claims Act 2 on publicly known information unless she played a
role in making the allegations public. In doing so, the court affirmed dismissal of a suit brought by an engineer who had direct
and independent knowledge of the information underlying the
allegations. The court stated that "[q]ui tam suits are meant to
encourage insiders privy to a fraud on the government to blow
the whistle on the crime. In such a scheme, there is little point
in' rewarding a second toot."3
The Ninth Circuit's holding is controversial. The False
Claims Amendments Act of 1992, passed by the House in Au1. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Poole, J.; the other panel
members were Fletcher, J., and Nelson, J.).
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1986).
3. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419.
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gust, 1992,· is incompatible with it. This note considers Wang in
the light of prior and pending legislation.
II. FACTS
Dr.1I Cheh-Cheng Wang worked as a mechanical engineer for
FMC for fourteen years. s He was fired' in 1986. Wang claimed
he was fired because he disclosed violations of the False Claims
Act by FMC to the California Department of Fair Employment
and Housing and to Congressman Norm Mineta. 8 FMC claimed
Wang was terminated for good cause, stating that his performance was below standard9 and that his attitude at work was arrogant and condescending. lo Wang sued FMC, as a qui tam plaintiff, for violations of the False Claims Act. The district court
dismissed the suit, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Wang was not the original source of the information in his complaints. l l
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

BACKGROUND

The phrase qui tam comes from the Latin expression qui
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,
which means "who brings the action for the king as well as for
himself."12 The qui tam plaintiff, called a relator, receives an
award (such as a percentage of the amount recovered) for successfully prosecuting the suit. 13 The rest of the recovery goes to
4. H.R. 4563, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 138 CONGo REC. H7978 (1992). At time of writing, this bill is still before the Senate Judiciary Committee, not yet passed by the Committee or by the Senate.
5. Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief
on Appeal at 6 [hereinafter FMC's Brief].
6. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal at 3-4.
7. Wang V. FMC Corp., 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992).
8. FMC's Brief at 5.
9.Id.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Wang V. FMC Corp., No. C-87-20814-WAI, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6683 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 1991).
12. Erickson V. American Inst. of Bio. Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 909 n.l (E.D. Va.
1989) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1768».
13. Congress' grant of a financial interest in the recovery is the basis for the plaintiff's standing in these actions. There have been several unsuccessful challenges of the
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the government. 14 Qui tam suits were' conducted in English
courts as early as the Fifteenth Century. III However, these suits
are creatures of statute, not common law. 16 Thus, a federal
court's jurisdiction to hear a qui tam complaint is determined by
the statute establishing the qui tam cause of action.
1.

The False Claims Act of 1863: All Plaintiffs Welcome

The False Claims Act was originally enacted in 1863 to combat rampant fraud by wartime contractors.17 The statute provided criminal and civil penalties, including double damages and
a $2000 forfeiture per violation. IS "Any person" could bring a
qui tam suit under the Act. 19 The successful relator was entitled
to a 50% share of the recovery.20 The Supreme Court has noted
that the 1863 Congress intended the phrase "any person" to be
interpreted broadly: even the District Attorney who prosecuted
a criminal action against a fraudulent defendant could become
the civil qui tam complainant. 21
standing of qui tam plaintiffs. Interesting discussions appear in James B. Helmer, Jr. &
Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False
Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and their Applications in
the United States ex rei. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.V. L.
REV. 35 (1991); Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Comment, "Missing the Analytical Boat": The Unconstitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 27 IDAHO L. REV.
319 (1991); Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the
False Claims Act, 57 V. CHI. L. REV. 543 (1990); Evan Caminker, The Cons,titutionality
of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989).
14. See supra note 13.
15. Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680, 681 (2nd Cir. 1945).
16. United States ex rei. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, 144 F.2d 186, 188 (2d
Cir. 1944) (qui tam awards under the Act (then popularly known as the "informer statute") were "of statutory creation ... wholly within the control of Congress"). See also
United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943) (history of courts showing
disfavor to such suits); Marra v. Burgdorf Realtors, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1000, 1012-13
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (same).
17. Helmer & Neff, supra note 13 at 36; Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of
the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525, 526 (1989).
18. United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir.
1991). Stinson's majority opinion by Sloviter, C.J., and. dissent by Scirica, J., both provide scholarly reviews of the history of the False Claims Act. The history of the 1863
version of the Act also comes under particular scrutiny in the majority (Black, J.) and
dissenting (Jackson, J.) opinions of United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943).
19. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 546.
20. Id. at 539.
21. Id. at 546 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 955-956. (1863».
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In the 1930's and early 1940's, several qui tam lawsuits were
filed that capitalized on rampant fraud by depression-era and
wartime government contractors.22 These complainants did
nothing to' expose the fraud and provided no independent
knowledge of the fraud. 23 Instead, they would copy the allegations from a criminal complaint filed by the government and use
them as the basis for their own qui tam action. This was a new
use of the Act. 2' In 1943, Attorney General Biddle characterized
these actions as "parasitic."2G In United States ex. rel. Marcus
v. Hess, the key case of this period, Justice Jackson explained 26
that this practice limited the Government's ability to control
criminal actions while providing a windfall to undeserving plaintiffs. Further, the law would become "downright vicious and corrupting"27 if police, prosecutors' or other government investigators could file suit as relators based on what they had learned on
the job. 28 The Court's majority recognized these and further issues as '~strong arguments of policy,"29 but concluded that "the
trouble with these arguments is that they are addressed to the
wrong forum. Conditions may have changed, but the statute has
not. "30 Relief had to come from Congress.
2.

The 1943' Amendments: Bar for Information in Possession
of the Government

Congress responded to Marcus with amendments to the
Act. The House initially passed a bill to repeal the False Claims
Act. 31 The original Senate bill barred qui tam suits that were
based on information in the possession of the goverment, unless
the information on which the suit was based was "original with
such person."32 Congress adopted the Senate bill, but without
22. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266,5275.
23. [d. at 10-11 (1986), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-5276. Several such cases are listed
infra note 36.
24. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 559.
25. United States ex reI. John Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir.
1992).
,
26. 317 U.S. at 556-62 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
27. [d. at 560.
28. [d.
29. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 546.
30. [d. at 547.
31. Stinson, supra note 18, at 1153.
32. [d. (quoting 89 CONGo REC. 510, 744 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1943».
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the original source exception. 33 This clause was dropped
"without explanation."84 As a result, no one (except the federal
government) could bring a qui tam action if the government already knew about the underlying fraud. 31!
The initial effects of the amendment were as expected.
Courts dismissed several suits in which the plaintiff relied on
information already collected by the government. 86
However, the 1943 bar also excluded legitimate actions. The
first hint of mischief came in 1949. 37 The plaintiff in this case
charged fraudulent claims by a business and corruption of the
involved government officials. "The learned District Judge
thought that, because plaintiff did not negative knowledge of the
fraud on the part of government officials, but on the contrary
charged their knowledge and complicity in the fraud, the court
was without jurisdiction to entertain the suit."38 The appellate
court reversed: the guilty knowledge of wrongdoing government
employees will not be imputed to the government for the purpose of barring a suit against the wrongdoers. 39
33. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266,5277.
34. [d. Few court opinions provide any explanation for the dropping of the clause,
but in United States v. Aster, 176 F. Supp. 208, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d 281
(3rd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, Aloft' v. Aster, 364 U.S. 894 (1960). Hastie, J., cited comments by Senator Langer, 89 CONGo REC. 10746-51, and Senate rejection of a corrective
amendment, 89 CONGo REC. 10752, to show that this was a debated issue, not an accident.
35. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5277-78.
36. See, e.g., United States ex. rei. Greenberg v. Burmah Oil Company Ltd., 558
F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 967 (1977) (no jurisdiction when the suit is
based on government-possessed information, not even on the basis of plaintiff's public
service in assembling, organizing and integrating the information in the government's
possession); United States ex. rei. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 154 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1946) (useful summary of the 1863 statute's legislative history and the 1943 amendments); Sherr v.
Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1945) (not an unconstitutional taking
of the relator's property to eliminate subject matter jurisdiction, including jurisdiction
over ongoing suits, for qui tam suits based on information in the possession of the government); United States ex rei. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 144 F.2d 186 (2d
Cir. 1944) (Congress has the right to change the terms of qui tam suits even for suits in
progress); United States ex rei. McLaughlin v. American Chain & Cable Co., 62 F. Supp.
302 (S.D. N.Y. 1945) (no jurisdiction to hear qui tam suit when all material information
elicited by the government, and no fees to relator for drawing the complaint).
37. United States v. Rippetoe, 178 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1949).
38. [d. at 736.
39. [d. at 738.
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The Rippetoe court also expressed doubt that Congress intended the bar against suits based on information already
known to the government to apply to the informer who gave
that information to the government. 40
Later decisions disagreed with the Rippetoe dictum. For example, in United States v. Aster,41 in 1960, the Third Circuit
ruled against an informer who sued under the False Claims Act
after the government failed to do anything with the evidence he
provided. 42 The informer's suit was barred because it was based
on information (that he had provided) in the possession of the
United States prior to the filing of the suit. 43 "The appellant
here chose to impart his material information to the United
States for its use rather than first bringing an action on his own
initiative ... By doing so he has brought himself within the jurisdictional prohibition. "44
Aster was followed for the next 26 years: to be able to bring
a qui tam suit, a person who knew about a fraud had to file the
complaint without first reporting the details to the
government. 411
United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean was a particularly
disconcerting example of this line of cases. Wisconsin successfully prosecuted the defendant in a state court criminal action
for making fraudulent claims for Medicaid reimbursements. The
40. [d. at 736.
41. 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960).
42. [d.
43. [d. at 283.
44. [d.
45. United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussed infra); United States ex rei. Weinberger v. Florida, 615 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1980);
Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979) (expresses strong reservations about the rule but applies it because it is the law); Pettis ex
rei. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1978) (United States
has no ethical duty to warn an informer that he will lose the right to file a qui tam action
if he divulges his evidence to the government); Oklahoma ex rei. Department of Human
Servo V. Children's Shelter, Inc. 604 F. Supp. 871 (W.O. Okla., 1985); United States ex
rei. Lapin V. International Business Machines Corp., 490 F. Supp. 244 (D. Haw. 1980)
(once informer has given the information to the government, she is barred from bringing
suit even if the government makes no effort to investigate or take action).
Contrary court decisions were rare: United States ex rei. Davis V. Long's Drugs, Inc.,
411 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Cal. 1976), broke with this rule but was overruled on this ground
by Pettis.
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state then brought a civil suit to recover damages under the
False Claims Act in federal court, on behalf of the United
States. 4e The United States declined to appear in the suit, leaving Wisconsin in control of the action. 47 In its statement of declination to the district court, the United States said that Wisconsin had "a special expertise" in investigating this type of
fraud and was "the proper party to conduct this action."4s The
. Seventh Circuit then ruled the suit barred because Wisconsin
had already given the evidence of fraud to the United States.
This bar was a trap for the unwary honest citizen. 49 By
1986, there were only about six qui tam cases per year:~o "Qui
tam actions under the [False Claims Act] had gone in forty
years from unrestrained profiteering to a flaccid enforcement
tool."61 Fraud, however, was still rampant - the Senate Report
on the False Claims Amendments Act described the problems of
fraud by government contractors as follows:
Most fraud goes undetected. Of the fraud that is
detected . . . the Government prosecutes and recovers its money in only a small percentage of
cases. . . . The Department of Justice has estimated fraud as draining 1 to 10 percent of the entire Federal budget, . . . costing taxpayers anywhere from $10 to $100 billion annually.... DOD
[Department of Defense] loses more than $1 billion just from fraudulent billing practices. Gi

46. Wisconsin, 729 F.2d at 1102.
47. Before the 1986 amendments, when a private plaintiff brought a False Claims
Act suit, the United States was required to either appear in the suit and completely take
over prosecution of it, excluding the plaintiff from further participation in the suit, or to
decline to appear, leaving all prosecution for the qui tam plaintiff. S. REP. at 25, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290. Section 3730 (c)(l) of the amended (1986) False Claims Act allows
the qui tam plaintiff to continue as a party, subject to a few restrictions. [d.
48. Wisconsin, 729 F.2d at 1103.
49. Pettis, 577 F.2d at 673.
50. H.R. REP. No. 1015, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 173 (1991).
51. United States ex rei. John Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir.
1992).
52. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5267 (citations omitted).
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3. Jurisdiction After 1986: The Original Source Requirement
In 1986, in order to encourage more qui tam suits,1I3
Congress revised the jurisdictional bar in the False Claims Act.
Section 3730(e) of the Act lists the restrictions. II.
The section relevant to Wang v. FMC is 3730(e)(4):
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action
under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office
Report, hearing audit, or investigation, or from
the news media, unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, 'original
source' means an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government
before filing an action under this section which is
based on the information.

B.

ApPLICATION TO WANG'S SUIT

In granting summary judgment against Wang's False Claims
Act claims, the district court stated that
[w]ith respect to most of the evidence offered by
Wang, he is not an "original source" and thus has
failed to satisfy the requirements of the False
Claims Act as a matter of law. The evidence for
which he is the original source is simply insufficient to support the claim that the Act was
violated. DD

Section 3730(e)(4) was the basis of the district court's ruling.
53. Id. at 23, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288 ("The [Senate Judiciary) Committee's overall intent in amending the qui tam section of the False Claims Act is to encourage more
private enforcement suits.").
54. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1986).
55. Wang v. FMC Corp., No. C-87-20814-WAI, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6683 at *5
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1991).
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Wang alleged fraud on four different projects, one of which
was the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.1I6 This is the project of
interest in the following discussion.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that,
in his allegations about the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Wang had
to, and did not, satisfy section 3730(e)(4)'s original source
requirement. 1I7
1.

Original Source Requirement: Direct and Independent
Knowledge

To meet the original source requirement of 3730(e)(4),
Wang must have "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based."lIs
The district court ruled that Wang was not the original
source of the Bradley information because that information had
been publicly disclosed. liB "[U]nder Houck, this evidence cannot
be 'direct and independent' and thus cannot serve as proof of a
violation of the False Claims Act. "60
Houck was an attorney who represented late claimants to
money set aside pursuant to a settlement order in a huge antitrust case. 61 In his suit, he alleged that the funds were being distributed in a way prohibited by the Seventh Circuit. 62 The Sev56. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417. The other three allegations are of lesser interest. The
court found that the source material on which Wang based these three complaints had
not been previously publicly revealed, and therefore his suits were not jurisdictionally
barred. 975 F.2d at 1416. But the suit failed on the merits because Wang "failed to
produce sufficient evidence to support an inference of fraud by FMC." 975 F.2d at 1420.
Under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) and 3729(b), Wang had to prove that FMC acted "knowingly" (with actual knowledge, in deliberate ignorance of the truth, or in reckless disregard of the truth). "Innocent mistake is a defense to the criminal charge or civil complaint. So is mere negligence." United States ex rei. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water
Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The Wang court held
that "[f]or each of his surviving claims, Wang has no evidence that FMC committed
anything more than 'innocent mistakes' or 'negligence,' if that." 975 F.2d at 1420.
57. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417-20.
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) (1986).
59. Wang, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6683.
60. Id. at *5.
61. Houck on Behalf of United States v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d
494 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
62. Houck, 881 F.2d at 503-04.
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enth Circuit held that Houck's knowledge of the Administration
Committee's practices was direct, by virtue of his direct relationship to, and interest in, the litigation. 68
However, the Seventh Circuit also decided that Houck's
knowledge was not independent of the public disclosure of the
Committee's distribution method. 6 • He could have learned what
the Committee was doing from the Committee's public notices. 6 &
The court therefore ruled that Houck did not meet the original
source requirement and affirmed the district court's dismissal of
his suit. 66
In Wang, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Houck stood for a
narrower proposition than the one advanced by the district
court:
The district court, purporting to follow Houck . ..
held that Wang's knowledge was not "direct and
independent." This was error.... Wang had personal knowledge of Bradley's transmission
problems because he worked (however briefly) on
trying to fix them. The fact that someone else
publicly disclosed the Bradley'S transmission
problems does not rob Wang of what he saw with
his own eyes. Wang's knowledge of the transmission problems was "direct and independent" because it was unmediated by anything but Wang's
own labor.

2.

Original Source Requirement: Voluntarily Provided the Information to the Government

To meet 3730(e)(4)'s original source requirement, Wang
must also show that he "has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section
which is based on the information. "67
There is no indication, in the district and appellate opinions
63. Id. at 505.
64.Id.
65.Id.
66.Id.
67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B).
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or in the parties' appellate briefs 68 that Wang did not voluntarily provide the information to the government.

3.

The Whistleblower Requirement

Even though Wang had direct and independent knowledge
of information that he voluntarily revealed to the government,
the Ninth Circuit was dissatisfied because Wang was "revealing
what is already publicly known."69 The court identified United
States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.
Prudential Insurance CO.70 as a particularly detailed review of
the history of the False Claims Act.71 Citing Stinson, the Wang
court stated that "[t]he paradigm qui tam plaintiff is the
'whistleblowing insider.' "72 A whistleblower reveals 'damaging
information that is not yet publicly known,73 and therefore
Wang was not a whistle blower. ,Someone else revealed the
problems with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle: "[i]f there is to be a
bounty for disclosing those troubles, it should go to the one who
in fact helped to bring them· to light"74 not, the court held, to
Wang. 711
According to the statutory wording, an original source must
have "direct and independent knowledge" and must have "voluntarily provided the information . . . to the Government. "76
There is no whistle blower requirement in the text of the statute. 77 This additional requirement was read into the statute by
the Wang court, and by the court in United States ex rel. Dick
v. Long Island Lighting Co., as mandated by the legislative in68. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal; Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal; Appellant's Reply Brief
(No. 91-15789).
69. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418.
70. 944 F.2d 1149, 1152-54, 1162-68 (3rd Cir. 1991).
71. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418. The court also referred readers to United States ex rei.
Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991), for a
detailed discussion of the history of the Act.
72. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419.
73. [d.
74. [d. at 1421.
75. [d.
76. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) (1986).
77. United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2nd Cir.
1990).
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tent of Congress. 78
As an example of the legislative intent, the Dic'k court cited
a statement by Representative Berman, one of the drafters of
the Act, that an original source has "some of the information
related to the claim which he made available to the government
or the news media in advance of the false claims being publicly
disclosed."79 Also, Senator Grassley, who introduced the legislation in the Senate, stated that the original source requirements
barred suits by anyone "who had not been an original source to
the entity that disclosed the allegations."8o Finally, the Dick
court quoted the House Report's statement of the purpose of the
qui tam provisions: "to encourage private individuals who are
aware of fraud being perpetrated against the Government to
bring such information forward. "81
The Wang court cited Dick with approval82 and added further legislative history: "the 1986 amendments are meant 'to encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring
that information forward.'83 The Ninth Circuit concluded its
analysis by stating that:
It is important to note that under the rule we
adopt today, all those who "directly or indirectly"
disclose an allegation might qualify as its original
source.... If, however, someone republishes an
allegation that already has been publicly disclosed, he cannot bring a qui tam suit, even if he
had "direct and independent knowledge" of the
fraud. He is no "whistleblower." A
"whistleblower" sounds the alarm; he does not
echo it. The Act rewards those brave enough to
speak in the face of a "conspiracy of silence," and
not their mimics."84
78. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419; Dick, 912 F.2d at 16.
79. Dick, 912 F.2d at 17 (emphasis original) (citing 132 CONGo REC. H9389 (daily ed.
October 7, 1986)).
80. [d. (emphasis in original) (citing 132 CONGo REC. S20,536 (daily ed. Aug. 11,
1986)).
81. Dick, 912 F.2d at 18 (citing HR REP. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986)).
82. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419.
83. [d. (citing S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267).
84. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419 (citations omitted).
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CRITIQUE

The legislative history of the Act is not so clear as it might
seem in the analyses 811 of United States ex rel. Dick v. Long
Island Lighting CO.86 and Wang v. FMC Corp.8?
The Wang court highlighted United States ex rei. Stinson,
Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Insurance CO.88
as a source of detailed discussion of the history of the False
Claims Act. 88 The Stinson majority had this to say about the
legislative history of the 1986 amendment: "[t]he bill that eventuated in the 1986 amendments underwent substantial revisions
during its legislative path. This provides ample opportunity to
search the legislative history and find some support somewhere
for almost any construction of the many ambiguous terms in the
final version. "90
A.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT UNAMBIGUOUSLY

Ex-

CLUDE NON-WHISTLEBLOWING ORIGINAL SOURCES

A leading review of the history of the 1986 amendments to
the False Claims Act says this about the' original sourc~ requirement: "It is interesting that for such a significant portion of the
Amendment, its legislative history is virtually non-existent."91
According to the Senate Report published as the legislative
history of the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,92 the
amendments were geared toward several related purposes, including the following: "[t]he purpose ... is to enhance the Government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud
against the government."9S The purpose is "to encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information
85.
86.
87.
88.

See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
912 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1990),
Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
944 F.2d 1149, 1152-54, 1162-68 (3d Cir. 1991).
89. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418.
90. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154.
91. Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22
AKRON L, REV, 525, 548 (1989).
92. R REP, No, 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266.
.
93.Id,
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forward. "94 "The Committee's overall intent in amending the
qui tam section of the False Claims Act is to encourage more
private enforcement suits. "911
The Wang court wrote that the False Claims Act "rewards
those brave enough to speak in the face of a 'conspiracy of silence' and not their mimics. Senate Report at 6, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5271."96 The Senate Report often referred to a
"conspiracy of silence" or, more generally, to the desirability of
encouraging whistleblowing. 97 However, the report did not explicitly state on page 6, or on any other page, that qui tam suits
should only be filed by whistle blowers ("and not their
mimics"98).
The original source requirement discussed in the Senate Report is slightly different from 31 U.S.C. 3730 (e)(4)-the Senate
Report says that:
[P]aragraph 4 disallows jurisdiction for qui tam
actions based on allegations disclosed in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing, a congressional or General Accounting Office report or
hearing, or from the news media, unless the action is brought 6 months after the public disclosure and the Government has failed to take any
action. BB

In other words, in the version of the bill described in the
Senate Report, "mimics"100 were explicitly allowed to bring suit
six months after public disclosure. 101
New subsection (e)(4) of section 3730 prohibits a
suit based solely on previous public disclosures
unless the Government has failed to act within 6
94. [d. at 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N at 5266-67.
95. [d. at 23, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288-89.
96. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419.
97. See, e.g., S. REP. at 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-67; S. REP. at 4, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269; S. REP. at 5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5270; S. REP. at 6, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271; S. REP. at 14, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5279; S. REP. at 25, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290; S. REP. at 34-35, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299-5300.
98. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419.
99. S. REP. at 30, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5295.
100. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419.
101. [d.
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months of the public disclosure. The Committee
recognizes that guaranteeing monetary compensation for individuals in this category could result in
inappropriate windfalls where the relator's involvement with the evidence is indirect at
best. . . . The Committee believes a financial
reward is justified in these circumstances if but
for the relator's suit, the Government may not
have recovered." (Emphasis added.)102
The six month time limit does not appear in 31 U.S.C. §
3730 (e)(4).I03 Only the Attorney General or a person who is an
original source of the information can bring the suit, not someone who obtained the information from public sources. I04 But
the removal of this provision does not tell us whether Congress
intended to imply a third requirement into the definition of
"original source,"IOIi that the source be a whistleblower.lo6
The Senate Report also stated the following:
Perhaps the most serious problem plaguing effective enforcement is a lack of resources on the part
of Federal enforcement agencies. . . . Allegations
that perhaps could develop into very significant
cases are often left unaddressed at the outset due
to a judgment that devoting scarce resources to a
questionable case may not be efficient. . . . The
Committee believes that the amendments . . .
which allow and encourage assistance from the
private citizenry can make a significant impact on
bolstering the Government's fraud enforcement
effort.lo7
Desirable assistance might come from a qui tam plaintiff
whether or not that plaintiff was the first person to reveal the
damaging information. Because the Judiciary Committee's "intent in amending the qui tam [provisions was] to encourage
102. S. REP. at 28, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5293.
103. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163-69 (Scirica, J., dissenting), for an extended discussion of the evolution of the wording of the original source requirement.
104. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A) (1986).
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) (1986).
106. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
107. S. REP. at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272.
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more private enforcement suits,"108 a reasonable reader could
conclude that Congress intended the definition of "original
source" to be read broadly to include sources who are not
whistle blowers.
B.

SUITS LIKE WANG'S MAY NOT BE PARASITIC

"One difficulty in interpreting the 1986 amendments is that
Congress was never completely clear about what kind of 'parasitic' suits it was attempting to avoid."I09
In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,llo the government
recovered a $54,000 fine from the defendant in a criminal prosecution l l l and an additional $150,000 from a qui tam suitll2 that
is generallyll3 cited as the trigger for restrictions on "parasitic"IH lawsuits. Arguably, the government benefited in this
case. The problem, though, is that if bounty hunters can file qui
tam suits as soon as they read about a government investigation
or prosecution, the government is forced to file its civil suit
early.IUi Otherwise, it will have to split the proceeds with the
bounty hunter(s). These "unseemly races [to the courthouse] for
the opportunity of profiting from the government's investigations"1l8 are undesirable. ll7 The jurisdictional bar, restricting
qui tam suits to plaintiffs who are original sources, was intended
to eliminate parasitic lawsuits. 1l8
However, the original source requirement has gone beyond
eliminating parasitic lawsuits: it has been used to bar suits in at
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

S. REP. at 23-24, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288-89.
Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
317 U.S. 537 (1942).
[d. at 545.
[d.
See, e.g., Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418; S. REP. at 10-11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-

76.
114. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163 (Scirica, J., dissenting); James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False
Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and their Applications in
the United States ex rei. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 35, 38 (1991).
115. S. REP. at 10-11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-76.
116. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 547.
117. S. REP. at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275.
118. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
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least two cases (Stinson 1l9 and Dick 120 ) in which the government
had not filed suit and would not otherwise recover any money.
There is no indication of other pending legislation in the Wang
court opinions and appellate briefs. 12l Because Wang's allegations related to events in 1983,122 Wang's suit was probably the
last opportunity for the government to recover damages from
these events. Therefore Wang's suit was arguably not undesirable nor parasitic.
C.

FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT

OF

1992

On August 11, 1992, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 4563, the False Claims Amendments Act of 1992.123 The
bill amends § 3730(e)(4) to eliminate the ambiguity of the original source requirement. 124
The accompanying report, from the House Committee on
119. See Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 593, 604-05 (1992).
. 120. [d. at 603.
121. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal; Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal; Appellant's Reply Brief
(No. 91-15789).
122. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1412.
123. 138 CONGo REC. H7978, H7980 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992).
124. The new language for the jurisdictional bar, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4) reads as
follows:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under
subsection (b) in which all of the material facts and allegations
are obtained from a news media report or reports, or a disclosure to the general public of a document or documents(i) created by the Federal Government;
(ii) filed in a lawsuit to which the Federal Government is
a party; or
(iii) relating to an open and active investigation by the
Federal Government;
unless the person brin{ting the action is an original source of
such facts and allegations.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, an individual is an 'original source' of material facts and allegations if such individual
has knowledge, independent from the sources listed in subparagraph (A), of such facts and allegations and has voluntarily
provided them to the Government. The person bringing the
action shall also be considered' an original source of any material facts or allegations developed as a result of information
provided to the Government by that person.
138 CONGo REC. H7979 (daily ed. August 11, 1992).
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the Judiciary, l2II states:
This amendment should eliminate any ambiguity
in the statute which would lead a court to conclude that there are any additional requirements
for qualifying as an original source. One court, for
example, concluded that in addition to having independent knowledge of the information and providing it to the government to qualify as an original source, the plaintiff also "must have directly
or indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is
based." United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990).128
The amendment clarifies that an original source is
not required to be a direct or independent source
to the entity that discloses the allegations. 127

The report also states that the Third Circuit's majority
opinion misconstrued the original source provision when it
barred information obtained during discovery in a previous lawsuit in Stinson. 128
H.R. 4563 is not yet law because it has not yet been passed
by the Senate Judiciary Committee or by the Senate. 12S If it becomes law in its present form, it will overrule Wang.
There is some reason to wonder whether H.R. 4563's
amendments to the original source requirement will come
through the Senate without amendment. On October 3, 1992,
the Senate passed S. 2652 (Health Care Fraud Prosecution
Act).lso The bill contains original source restrictions similar to
the False Claims Act, but defines an "original source" as "a person who has direct and independent knowledge of the information that is furnished and has voluntarily provided the informa125. H. R. REP. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992).
126. The report cited only Dick, and not also Wang, because Wang was not filed for
another month.
127. H.R. Rep. at 14.
128. Id. at 8.
129. A check of the BC database on Westlaw on January 18, 1993 indicated that the
bill had not passed the Senate Judiciary Committee or the Senate, but the "Odds that
bill will pass" these stages were rated at 100% and 95% respectively.
130. 138 CONGo REC. S16,526 (daily ed. October 3, 1992). According to the BC
database on Westlaw, this bill has not yet passed the House Judiciary Committee.
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tion to the Government prior to disclosure by the news
media. "131 If the qui tam original source definition were worded
this way, it would accord with Dick and Wang and contradict
the wording of H.R. 4563. 132
IV.

CONCLUSION

In their appellate briefs, the parties did not consider
whether a party had to be a paradigmatic whistle blower to be an
original source of False Claims Act information. 133 Wang argued
that he was an original source because he was disclosing previously undisclosed information. 134 FMC argued that it had not
committed fraud, that Wang's evidence did not support an inference of fraud, and that Wang submitted too little independent,
non-public evidence to be considered an original source. 131i
Neither party argued that Wang could have had direct and independent knowledge of the allegations, have reported them to the
government, but still not be an original source because he was
not involved in making them public. Neither party reviewed the
Act's legislative history around this issue or corrected the other
party's review. La:cking the benefit of this adversarial analysis,
the Wang 136 court's holding might reasonably be subjected to a
good-faith challenge.
Vogel stated that Congress might amend the False Claims
Act before his paper was published. 137 There is no telling when
the amendments will pass or what they will finally say. Until
then, H.R. 4563 is yet another indication that Congress intended
to allow suits like Wang's.138 Combined with legislative history
of the 1986 amendments,139 a qui tam plaintiff's counsel has rea131. [d. (emphasis added).
132. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
133. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal; Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal; Appellant's Reply Brief
(No. 91-15789).
134. See, e.g., Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal at 15.
135. Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition at 8-11.
136. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
137. Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 593, 594 (1992).
138. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
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son to argue that Dick 140 and Wang should be ignored or
overruled.
However, the wording of S. 2652 suggests that Congress did
intend to bar suits similar to Wang's. This is supported by the
legislative history cited in Wang and Dick. 141
Congress' intended definition of an "original source" is
therefore ambiguous. Arguments can be made to support two
conflicting interpretations. Interpreting Congressional intent is
often a controversial process. 142 When the intent is ambiguous
and a "straightforward reading"143 of the statute is possible,
there is reason to argue that the straightforward reading should
prevail over a suggestion of a different Congressional intent. In
the present case, the straightforward reading indicates that "a
qui tam plaintiff must (1) have direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based, -and
(2) have voluntarily provided the information to the government."lH The additional requirement adopted by the Dick and
Wang courts, that the plaintiff must be a whistle blower, was
based on a review of questionable legislative intent. Though it
carries significant moral force, I conclude that the addition of
this requirement is inappropriate until Congress acts to clarify
its intent.

Cem Kaner, Ph.D. *

140. United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir.
1990).
141. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1988); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions",' The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39
(1990).
143. Dick, 912 F.2d at 16.
144. [d.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/19

20

